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FREE SPEECH AND CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS:

COMMENTARY ON ROBERT F. NAGEL, "A NEW
METHODOLOGY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CASES?" AND
STEVEN J. HEYMAN, "IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT"

SUSAN J. BRISON*

Both Robert Nagel and Steven Heyman acknowledge that, in
some cases, free speech rights conflict with other-equally weighty, or
perhaps even weightier-rights, and I could not agree more. To take
just a couple of current controversies: Professor Nagel concurs with
Justice Stevens that the issue in Hill v. Colorado1 is whether the socalled "bubble law" reflects an appropriate balance between the First
Amendment rights of the abortion protestors and "the state's legitimate interest in 'the avoidance of potential trauma to patients"'
seeking to use health care facilities.2 (Using more explicit rights-talk,
one might recast the state's interest as one in protecting the right of
patients not to be unjustly harmed by being traumatized en route to
medical treatment.) And Professor Heyman argues that, in the case
of violent degrading pornography, the free speech right in question
clashes with women's fundamental right to be recognized as human
beings.3
In both cases, the authors argue that the right in conflict with the
free speech right is weightier than-and should take priority over* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College.
1. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
2. Robert F. Nagel, Six Opinions by Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology for
ConstitutionalCases?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 509, 511-12 (2003) (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 715).
3. Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 531, 578 (2003).
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the free speech right. In both cases, their positions are at odds with
the general trend of the Court's traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, and rightly so, in my view. However, both Nagel and
Heyman are more sanguine than I am about the possibility of resolving these conflicts by means of some consistent First Amendment
doctrine. I would argue that no such doctrine can be found.
In "A New Methodology for Constitutional Cases?," Robert
Nagel starts out sounding as if he has come to praise Justice John
Paul Stevens for his iconoclastic approach to standard First Amendment doctrine, finding, in Stevens' majority opinion in Hill v. Colorado, a "potentially attractive reconceptualization of free speech
discourse." 4 But he ends up burying Stevens in a heap of invective,
accusing him of being "opportunistic rather than iconoclastic," 5 of
drawing on "a harshly judgmental and intolerant strain in American
political life,"6 and of "impos[ing] a form of severe and suppressive
judgmentalism,"7 which replaces "the superficial rigor of doctrinalism" with "nothing more than the ad hoc imposition of personal
'8
moral preferences.
In Nagel's view, not only are Stevens' opinions in the cases he
discusses inconsistent, but what might have seemed, in Hill, to be "a
step toward a more thoughtful and realistic methodology in free
speech cases" 9 is revealed in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale10 (among
other cases) to be merely "the overconfident imposition of highly
debatable personal preferences."'1 It is not just that Stevens' dissent
in Dale is wrong, according to Nagel, but it is wrong in a deeply
revealing and disorienting way, like the proverbial thirteenth chime of
a crazy clock that throws everything that came before into question.
So what went wrong between Hill and Dale? As I see it, nothing.
I find no inconsistency between Stevens' opinions in these two cases.
Nagel's conclusion is one possible interpretation of what is driving
Stevens' opinion in Hill, Dale, and the other cases discussed; but the
principle of charity in interpretation requires us, before accepting it,
to check to see whether, on some other, more plausible, construal, his
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Nagel, supra note 2, at 514.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 515.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Nagel, supra note 2, at 529.
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position is, in fact, consistent across these cases. I will focus my
discussion on Stevens' opinions in Hill and Dale, since the alleged
inconsistency in Stevens' positions is portrayed most starkly by Nagel
in these cases.
Although Hill and Dale address very different sorts of conflicts,
they both pit a free speech right against a right not to be unjustly
harmed by the speech in question. In Hill, the conflict is between the
right to free speech and the right not to be unjustly harmed by being
traumatized en route to medical treatment, while in Dale the conflict
is between the right to freedom of expressive association and the
compelling state interest "in eliminating the destructive consequences
of discrimination from society," or, framed in terms of individual
rights, the right not to be unjustly harmed by being deprived of "the
' 12
advantages and privileges 'of any place of public accommodation.'
And, as Stevens notes, in his dissent in Dale, up until that case, the
Court had "never once found a claimed right to associate in the
selection of members to prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law." 13 In both cases, Stevens argued, rightly, in my view, that
the free speech right is less weighty than the right not to be unjustly
harmed by others' expressive conduct. (Incidentally, or perhaps not,
in both Hill and Dale, Stevens deferred to the judgment of the state
legislature.)
Nagel takes Stevens to task for not even acknowledging what
Nagel considers to be the genuine conflict of legitimate interests at
stake in Dale. But I would argue that it is not Stevens' position that
shifts from Hill to Dale. Rather, Nagel's analysis of the former case
shifts in the course of his article. In his initial discussion of Hill,Nagel
construes the interest at odds with the abortion protesters' free
speech rights to be, as Colorado framed it, "the state's legitimate
interest in 'the avoidance of potential trauma to patients"' seeking to
use health care facilities. 14 In his discussion of Dale, however, Nagel
construes the right at odds with the free speech right in Hill as "the
right to be left alone"' 5 and he asserts that "the relevant interest was
that the patients did not want to associate with the protesters .... -16

12. Dale, 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West
Supp. 2000)).
13. Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Nagel, supra note 2, at 511-12.
15. Id. at 517.
16. Id. at 524.
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He labels this a "strong privacy interest"17 and likens it to the interest
on the part of the Boy Scouts to avoid associating with homosexuals.
As Nagel construes the conflict in Dale, "the Boy Scout organization
wished to cut off an uncomfortable association while Dale insisted on
continuing that association."18 Nagel takes Stevens to task for not
finding it "at least plausible" that "the members of the Scouts organization might feel-and might be entitled to feel-an acute sense of
unease in the presence of an unwanted, persistent participant .... ""
But what the members of the Scouts might feel (or be entitled to
feel, if, indeed, that makes sense) is not what is at issue here. The
law's reach does not extend to the unexpressed inner states of citizens. That the Scouts, some anyway, can-and do-feel unease in the
presence of homosexuals is not in dispute. What is at issue is whether
they can discriminate against homosexuals solely on the basis of this
unease, and this, Stevens' dissent persuasively argues, they cannot
(legally) do. The "right to be let alone" is not a right to be free from
discomfort in all of one's associations. It is certainly not a right to
achieve a feeling of comfort by means of the invidious discriminatory
exclusion of others.
Steven Heyman points out, in "Ideological Conflict and the First
Amendment," that cultural conflict is inevitable in the First Amendment area, since controversies over civil liberties at the time the Bill
of Rights was drafted led the framers to cast the rights in terms of
general principles, while avoiding particular divisive issues. I agree
with his claims in this paper: that, given the First Amendment's lack
of any clear and precise directives in certain controversial areas,
conflict is inevitable; that resolving such conflicts involves contextualized and complex judgments about the nature of our society and
about the substantive values at stake; and that constitutional interpretation is best seen as dialectical, with a major task of constitutional
jurisprudence being that of developing a framework in which debate
can take place.
Heyman argues that "many First Amendment problems should
be understood as conflicts between free speech and other rightsrights that are rooted in the same values as free speech itself." 20 His
view of free speech is that it is a fundamental right "rooted in respect
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Heyman, supra note 3, at 534.
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for persons and their capacity for autonomy or self-determination" 21
as well as in the values of democratic self-government and the pursuit
of truth. I have argued that defenses of free speech that attempt to
ground it in a right to autonomy or in the value of democratic selfgovernment or the value of truth fail to provide support for a special
right to free speech, distinct from a general principle of liberty.22
Heyman acknowledges that "the same principles that justify free
speech also give rise to other fundamental rights," such as personal
security, privacy, and reputation. 23 But why stop there?, I would ask
him. Why not say these values ground a general right to liberty (as
expressed in Mill's harm principle)?24 One could go even further and
argue that "respect for persons and their capacity for autonomy and
self-determination" also grounds positive rights to food, shelter,
clothing, education, medical care, and other necessities. But if the
right to free speech is grounded in a general right to autonomy, what
makes speech special? Why suppose speech deserves greater protection than nonspeech conduct even when it is harmful?
Well, there is, as a matter of contingent historical fact, a right to
free speech embedded in our Constitution. I argue that there is no
sound philosophical basis for it. But what follows from that? Does it
follow that in cases of conflicts of rights, the other right (to equality,
to security, to privacy, etc.) takes priority if it is philosophically
justified? But what grounds these other rights-or are they also mere
historically contingent artifacts? I would argue that they, like a
general principle of liberty (constrained by the harm principle), are
also grounded in our autonomy. The moral imperative of respect for
autonomy requires the government to protect (and foster) certain
political and legal rights, and I would add, socioeconomic ones as
well. The right to free speech is one of those, but it is simply part of a
general right to liberty.
My view is not that there is no right to free speech, but rather
that there is no special right distinct from a general right to liberty.
But perhaps there is a special right in the sense in which some people
use the term; some of those opposed to legislation protecting the
21. Id. at 567.
22. I argue against the autonomy defense of free speech in Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy
Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 312-39 (1998). I argue against the argument from
truth and the argument from democracy, as foundations for the right to free speech, in SUSAN J.
BRISON, SPEECH, HARM AND CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS (forthcoming).

23. Heyman, supra note 3, at 569.
24. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Hackett 1978) (1859).
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rights of women, racial minorities, and homosexuals object that such
laws grant these "favored" groups special rights, that is, rights not
possessed by the rest of us. But minority rights are not special rights
in this sense. Rather, special legislation is needed because the rights
of people in these groups just happen (as an historically contingent
fact) to be more threatened. So, if society were different (if we
already had achieved substantive equality, eliminated prejudice, etc.),
we would not need to give the rights of people in these groups special
protection. I think it makes sense to consider the right to free speech
to be a special right in this latter sense. Free speech is not a special
right in the sense that there is something special about speech itself,
as opposed to all other human conduct, that requires us to grant it
favored status. Rather, it just so happens that, of all the rights
considered to fall under the rubric of a general right to liberty, the
right to free speech has been (and continues to be) more vulnerable
to governmental invasions than the others-though perhaps not all
the others: the right to freedom of religion certainly falls into this
category as well. It is not a coincidence that both free speech and
freedom of religion are protected by the First Amendment, since both
had historically been threatened by governments. It does not follow,
though, that speech is "special" (more central to autonomy) any more
than it follows that religion is "special" (more central to autonomy)
than other human pursuits, such as scientific, literary, and artistic
ones-or that religious affiliations and practices are more central to
autonomy than, say, sexual affiliations and practices.
My own view is that the moral imperative of respect for autonomy requires the government to protect (and foster) certain political
and legal rights (and, I would add, socioeconomic ones as well). The
right to free speech is one of those, but it is simply part of a general
right to liberty. But my skepticism about there being a justifiable
special right to free speech is an extreme one that puts me outside the
mainstream of currently acceptable academic positions on free
speech. So it is undoubtedly a virtue of Heyman's approach that he
disagrees with me on this score.

